

SECRET

7- 8

OPT. ONAL  
5010-104

Approved For Release 2002/07/01 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070007-6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

25X1

# Memorandum

TO : Acting Chief, D/T

DATE: 1 March 1966

FROM : Chief, T/CST

SUBJECT: Status of PIB reporting on bomb damage in North Vietnam from IAD/NPIC

1. In three days our report on bomb damage assessment will be due (4 March 1966). The situation at this moment forces us to conclude that our report will be anything but current. This is the situation:

a. Since our last report (4 Feb 66) we have received from IAD three reports which deal with bomb damage in North Vietnam since the resumption of bombing on the 30th of Jan 1966. These reports are of bomb damage from missions flown on 2 and 3 Feb 1966 which were received in this Office from IAD on 25 Feb 1966 (this is a lag of 22 days).

b. Since our last report (4 Feb 66) we have also received PIB's from IAD based on 14 "Recce" missions of bomb damage caused by bombing missions flown prior to cessation (24 Dec 1965).

<u>Number of Reports</u>	<u>Date of Recce Mission</u>
2	Nov 26 & 30
1	Dec 6
11	Jan 1-18
<u>14</u> (Total)	

We assume that Recce missions were continued beyond 18 January, thru the end of January, however, we have not received any PIB's from IAD covering this period.

c. In addition to the blank space above (19-31 January) we have no PIB's from 3 February to date. In a telephone conversation with [ ] IAD this morning he stated that he would forward four reports which we should receive tomorrow (2 March 66). Two of the reports cover a mission flown on 2 February and two reports cover a mission flown on 10 February. They received the film for these two missions on Saturday, 26 February 1966. We assume that there must be film somewhere for several missions between the resumption of bombing (30 Jan 66) and the most recent PIB which we hope to receive tomorrow, in addition to the two missions 2 and 10 February, which has not been made available to IAD. Moreover, there

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/07/01 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070007-6

is a gap of nearly three weeks, 11 February to date, for which we have no reporting. There is no doubt that many strikes against bridges have been made in the periods mentioned above and that pictures of the damage have been made and reports are being prepared which at least in part are being based on this photography. For example, we have attached a recapitulation of bridge damage prepared by DIA for the National Military Command Center, DOD. It is noted that the latest report is less than one week old (24 Feb 66). Also, for a telephone conversation with [redacted] this morning we have learned that he has photography as late as 17 February 66. The question is, where are the pictures and why hasn't IAD received the earlier ones? 25X1

The problem, which is a recurring one, as we see it lies with DIA and perhaps to a lesser extent with PAG/NPIC. We get the feeling based on some of our experiences that there has been, and continues to be, a studied attempt on the part of some elements in the military establishment to prevent us from satisfactorily carrying out this assignment. We cannot achieve accuracy and currentness if we do not have these pictures with a much higher degree of timeliness. In our opinion it will serve no useful purpose at this time to recite the details which force us to conclude that DIA is not giving us full cooperation. Suffice it to say that from the very beginning of this assignment (September 1965) they have been "pulling back in the breeching."

2. What can be done in the short run to alleviate the situation? Not much that will help this report. Even if we supply final estimate figures as late as Friday, 11 March, there is every indication that we still will have a lag of 3 weeks which means that report will not accurately reflect the actual bomb damage after mid-February.

3. What can we do in the long run so that we may have an accurate, complete and current report on 1 April? We suggest the same procedure adopted last fall. That is to persuade DIA, with an assist from the DD/I Office, to return to the film distribution and scheduling plan which worked so well in November and December 1965. Failing in this, the sole remaining alternative is to arrange for making another duplicate positive regardless of cost.

4. As we see it, the situation boils down to just this; for various reasons DIA is not able to provide satisfactory damage assessments and at the same time they are bound and determined that we don't either. At the moment the odds in this contest seem to be in their favor.

25X1A9A

